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STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
r This action was brought requesting declaration of 
invalidity and unenforceability of a document entitled 
"Agreement to Sell Cattle arid Lease Land With Option to 
Purchase11 and for damages. . 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court found the document to be a valid 
and enforceable agreement and held that Appellant had no 
cause of action. The court also supplied a description 
of lands which it found to be covered by the document in 
dispute and held that Respondents are entitled to specific 
performance of the agreement it found to exist. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have this court reverse the Judg-
ment and Decree of the trial court and hold that the doc-
ument entitled "Agreement to Sell Cattle and Lease Land 
With Option to Purchase" is invalid and unenforceable.,,, 
,. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant, Lowell L. Brady, is a 75-year old man who 
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has owned and operated various properties with livestock 
operations near Rangely, Colorado, since the 1920!s. (TR. 
33). ' - .;>,, ;,, 
These properties are designated in purple on the map 
at Page 3 of this brief and are referred to in this brief, 
as they were by both Mr. Brady and Mr. Fausett in their 
testimony at trial, by the names of the separate ranches. 
(TR. 32, 33) Two of the ranches had passed out of Mr. 
Brady1s control at the time of the July 25, 1972 document 
which is of concern in this case. One of these two ranches 
is referred to by Mr. Fausett (TR. 8) as a big ranch and 
good cattle ranch which Mr. Fausett purchased from Mr. 
Brady in April of 1972 consisting of 1,720 acres and B.L.M. 
grazing permits. (TR. 8, 32, 33 & 91) Another had been 
sold to Mr. Brady's son, Douglas Brady. (TR. 134) In 
addition to these two ranches, Mr. Brady had acquired 
from time to time properties operated as separate ranches 
by previous owners, and he as well as Respondents and 
others continued to call these ranches by the names of pre-
vious owners; -i.e., N-Bar (TR. 293 & 321), Williams, (TR. 
-2-
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32 & 259), Milner (TR. 32), Gomez (TR. 32), McNeil (TR. 
32, 214), Gross (TR. 32), Morgan Place (TR. 32, 241), 
Ralph Rasmussen (TR. 32), Pete Atencio (TR. 32), John W. 
Rasmussen (TR. 32), Daisey Kirk Place or Homestead (TR. 
131, 224, 293, 295, & 305). One of the separate ranches 
is referred to in Paragraph 3 of the "Agreement to Sell 
Cattle and Lease Land With Option to Purchase". The cat-
tle were to be delivered to "Seller's Homestead Ranch (the 
Daisy Kirk Place)11. (Exhibit 4) 
As indicated on the map, which is a copy of the map 
used and referred to at the trial (TR. 31 & 32), the lands 
involved are non-continguous parcels separated from each 
other in some cases by many miles, and they are inter-
spersed among lands owned by .others. Three of the separ-
ate properties are located in Garfield County, Colorado, 
and the remainder in Rio Blanco County, Colorado. Some 
of the lands were mortgaged to the Connecticut General 
Life Insurance Company and others were not. (TR. 128) Some 
of the lands were used as base lands to maintain U. S. 
Bureau of Land Management Grazing privileges. Others had 
no grazing privileges attached to them and were operated 
-4-
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separate from any connection to B.L.M. lands. (TR. 109) 
In addition, Mr. Brady operated a ranch in the same gen-
eral area in the 1920!s before he acquired most of the 
lands which he now owns and acquired after 1942 (TR. 33). 
Mr. Brady is the father of four sons and two daugh-
ters. (TR. 31) In March or April of 1972, Mr. Brady be-
came acquainted with Respondent, John E. Fausett, and an 
unusually close relationship developed between the two 
men. (TR. 7, 9, 36) Mr. Brady's wife of fifty years was 
being cared for in a convalescent home at Roosevelt, Utah, 
near Mr. Fausett!s home. Mrs. Brady had suffered from 
serious illness, including a stroke, since 1965. (TR. 9, 
36, 37, 38, 39 & 40) Mrs. Brady had been in Roosevelt for 
over a year, having been moved there after being kept at 
the Utah State Hospital in Provo, Utah, as well as in Las 
Vegas, Nevada, and in Manti, Utah. (TR. 37, 38, 39 & 40) 
During the time Mrs. Brady was in Roosevelt, Mr. Brady 
commuted back and forth between his cattle operation in 
Colorado and the Roosevelt convalescent home almost daily, 
attempting to be with his wife as much as possible yet 
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*0®f 
still hold onto the ranching operation into which he had 
put his entire life. (TR. 9 & 41) 
Mr. Brady, during this same period of time, exper-
ienced a falling out with two of his sons who had pre-
viously worked with him in his livestock operation, and 
they now refused to lend a hand. (TR. 11, 41 & 42) Fi-
nancially, Mr. Brady was in trouble and faced the prospect 
of losing his entire operation. (TR. 152) Under the 
pressure of these events, Mr. Brady himself became phy-
sically ill, and mentally and physically exhausted, and 
he realized he could no longer carry on. (TR. 26, 42, 43, 
48, 53, 79, 80, 205, 208, 209 & 214) 
Mr. Brady stayed nights and was taken care of at the 
Fausett. home over a period of many weeks during the last 
of Mrs. Brady's illness before she died in June of 1972. 
(TR^9, 46) Mr. Brady came to confide in Mr. Fausett and 
trust him with him problems (TR. 47 & 48) and his finan-
cial circumstances. (TR. 260) Mr. Fausett realized that 
Mr. Brady had placed his trust in him (TR. 267) and told 
other people about it. (TR. 10, 264, 267, 268) As Mr. 
-6-
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Fausett learned that Mr. Brady was incapable of managing 
his business and saw Mr. Brady so sick he couldn!t work 
(TR. 53), he took a hand in Mr. Brady1s affairs. Mr. Fau-
sett worked with Mr. Brady's cattle, bought Mr. Brady a 
new pickup truck, (TR. 12, 23, 24, 50, 51 & 52) and gen-
erally concerned himself with Mr. Brady's interests. 
As Mr. Brady's financial circumstances grew more ser-
ious, he asked Mr. Fausett to help him by managing or leas 
ing his lands until he could get back on his feet mentally 
and health-wise. Mr. Fausett testified at the trial: 
"I told him at that time I was not in-
terested in the property because I did not 
feel that it was fair to him, or me or any-
one else to take the place at this time." 
(Emphasis supplied) 
(TR. 26) Mr. Fausett understood the pressures under which 
Mr. Brady was laboring and admitted in the quoted sen-
tence that Mr. Brady was in no condition to deal on a 
major transaction. Mr. Fausett reported to Lois Adams, 
Mr. Brady's daughter, at a later time that he: 
"didn't see how . . . (Mr. Brady) . . . 
had been able to keep from having a mental 
breakdown,- that he had spent fifty to six-
ty nights in his home the previous ten 
months, and that Mrs. Fausett had cared for 
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Cff^t* 
him as he was very ill, and . . . that when 
he was trying to get together the cattle that 
Spring, he was trying to gather them by him-
self. And John told me that he saw my father 
going along with a string of cans shaking them 
behind the cattle trying to get at these cattle 
alone, and then he would stop and break down 
and cry, and then he would pick up a stick and 
go along, and try to gather cattle without any 
other help.11 (TR. 214) 
Mr. Brady asked Mr. Fausett to help him arrange a 
loan to meet his financial obligations until he could 
get back on his feet and fend for himself. (TR. 50 & 
266) Mr. Fausett contacted Respondent, George L. Smith, 
and Smith and Fausett looked over the Brady operation and 
various properties. When Respondents realized that Mr. 
Brady was in no condition physically or mentally to con-
tinue to operate his properties, they decided rather than 
offer financial help by way of a loan, they would attempt 
to acquire the properties. (TR. 55 & 58) 
Mr. Brady told them he was in no condition to talk 
that kind of business (TR. 56) and let them know that in 
any event he would never sell the Milner Place. The Mil-
ner Place was special in that it had been purchased by 
-8-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Mr. Brady from the original patentee, and it was there 
that a cabin had been built where the Brady family had 
lived when the children were growing up. These lands 
had great sentimental value to Mr. Brady, especially at 
that time near his wifefs death. He had communicated 
this feeling to Respondents and told them he had two 
daughters to whom he had promised these lands. (TR. 34, 
35, 57 & 58) On the occasion when Respondents Smith and 
Fausett were shown this place in early July of 1972, Mr. 
Brady broke down when he told them about his feelings 
concerning it. Mr. Smith said: "Mr. Brady, don't never 
sell that place." (TR. 57 6c 58) and Mr. Brady answered: 
"I don't intent to." There was never any question that 
Mr. Brady did not intend to part with the Milner Place 
under any circumstances. 
When Mr. Fausett learned that Mr. Smith would join 
him and back him financially if he could get Mr. Brady 
to turn the operation over, he began anxiously to pursue 
the matter. He proposed that Mr. Brady sell to himself 
and Mr. Smith an interest in his operation (TR. 184) which 
-9-
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was rejected. Later he proposed a joint project which 
would guarantee Mr. Brady $47,000.00 a year profit. (TR. 
58 & 255) Mr. Brady also rejected that proposal, but 
suggested a sale of his cattle and a ten-year lease on 
the land at a rental of $25,000.00 per year. With the 
sale of the cattle and the earlier sale of lands to Mr. 
Fausett, Mr. Brady felt he would have his financial ob-
ligations taken care of, an income of $25,000.00 a year, 
and freedom from the responsibility of operating the ranch. 
This arrangement was agreed upon. (TR. 58, 59, 137, 138, 
255 & 256) 
During the latter part of July, Brady, Fausett and 
Smith met at the office of Hugh W. Colton, an attorney in 
Vernal, Utah. The purpose of the meeting at Mr. Colton1s 
office was to prepare an agreement regarding the sale of 
Mr. Brady!s cattle and a ten-year lease of his lands. 
(TR. 69) The annual rental of $25,000.00 was agreed upon 
prior to the meeting. (TR. 68, 69) 
When Mr. Brady arrived at Mr. Colton1s office, Mr. 
Fausett and Mr.„ Smith were already there. A discussion, 
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and later an argument and disagreement ensued wherein Mr. 
Colton, Mr. Fausett and Mr. Smith attempted to persuade 
Mr. Brady to sell, not just lease his lands. (TR. 69 6c 
70) Mr. Brady insisted he did'not want to sell. (TR. 69 
& 70) In addition, he argued that even if he were to sell, 
some of the lands had to be reserved for his two daughters. 
Both Mr. Colton and Mr. Brady referred to the disagreement 
when they testified at trial. (TR. 70, 242) Although Mr. 
Colton was in theory Mr. Brady1s attorney, he urged Mr. 
Brady to sell and took an active part in attempting to 
set a price on the lands, contrary to Mr. Brady1s wishes. 
(TR. 69, 88 & 89) Because the argument caused Mr. Brady 
great distress from a severe prostate problem, he was 
forced to leave the office for some time to visit the 
rest room. (TR. 70) 
When Mr. Brady returned, he was told that Mr. Col-
ton, Mr. Fausett and Mr. Smith had gone to a nearby res-
taurant and that he was to go there to meet them. (TR. -
70) The parties talked further and when they returned 
to Mr. Colton1s office, Mr. Brady was presented with an 
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already typed document entitled MAgreement to Sell Cattle 
and Lease Lands With Option to Purchase.? (Exhibit 4) 
This document set forth the agreement of the parties re-
garding the sale to Fausett and Smith of Mr. Brady's cat-
tle. It also contained provision for a lease of lands f 
with an annual rental of $25,000.00; the term of the 
lease, however, was for five (5) years rather than the 
previously agreed upon term of ten (10) years. In add-
ition, the document provided for an option to purchase 
lands which Mr. Brady insisted should not be included. 
Mr. Brady knew that without a sale of his cattle he 
would probably lose his holdings to his creditors. Respon-
dents, however, had given him a choice of accepting the en-
tire transaction on their terms in effect, or losing the 
property to the bank. This, of course, including the op-
tion to purchase, after Mr. Brady had taken Mr. Fausett 
into his confidence and revealed his personal affairs to 
him, and after Mr. Fausett had led Mr. Brady to rely on 
receiving payment for his cattle to extract himself from 
his financial 'difficulties. Now he had to either accept 
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the deal on Respondents1 terms or he would get no money. 
The document entitled "Agreement to Sell Cattle and 
Lease Land With Option to Purchase1' was prepared with 
such haste that when it was submitted to Mr. Brady it was 
incomplete in that it had no description of the properties 
to be included. The document recites as follows: 
"Seller agrees to and hereby leases to 
Buyers the following described real property 
situated in Rio Blanco and Garfield Counties, 
Colorado, for a period of five (5) years, at 
an annual rental of $25,000.00 per year. The 
year's rental to be paid on or before January 
2, 1973, and on January 2 of every year there-
after during the five-year term of this lease. 
The said land leased herein is described as 
follows:11 (Exhibit 4, Paragraph 7 ) 
The document then states: "(Description will be placed 
here)11 (Exhibit 4) in the center of the page. No pro-
perty description was placed in the document at that time 
as there had been no agreement reached as to which lands 
were to be included or excluded. The transcript shows 
without contradiction that Mr. Brady insisted on with-
holding lands and would not agree otherwise (TR. 88 & 89), 
and that Mr. Smith would not agree to that. (TR. 242) 
No agreement was ever reached on that point and thus no 
-13-
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description was placed in the contract. If it had been 
otherwise, a reference to all property could easily have 
been made. Mr. Brady had maintained that he did not want 
to sell at all, and at the vdry least that he had to hold 
certain lands for his daughters. Mr. Brady's objection 
to the sale of all lands was stated unequivocally and with-
out contradiction at the time the document was discussed 
at Mr. Colton's office. At the trial, Mr. Brady said: 
"A: Right while I was in Mr. Colton's 
office I said, 'Hugh, Ifm terribly bugged about 
this thing1." 
"Q: What did you mean, 'bugged1?11 
fIA: Well, I was all shook up. I told him 
I says 'This isn't the way we started out with 
this deal, because it had been changed to a 
five-year lease and there had . . . there was an 
option here.' And he said, 'Forget it'. He 
said, 'You'll never be able to . . . You've 
got all the money that you need.' And I said, 
'Hugh, there's a sentimental reason here that 
you're over-looking'." 
At the time Mr. Brady placed his signature on the a-
greement without any property description to get the cat-
tle sold, he said: 
"A: *I told Mr. Colton, I said, 'There are 
-14-
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lands here that I'm turning to my daughters1. 
I have daughters that I told them that I 
would keep the Milner Place (the) the Williams 
Place for my family. And he said 'Mr. Brady1, 
he said, 'I've seen so much of that over in 
Dry Fork, right over here, (indicating) I've 
handled many cases, and1 he said, 'let it all 
go.1 And I said, 'No, Mr. Colton. I can't 
do it because I promised my family that I 
would keep part of these lands.11' 
(TR. 88 & 89) 
Mr. Fausett also testified concerning a discussion 
in Mr. Colton's office at which Mr. Brady said, "I would 
like to keep the little area that I have fenced around 
the Milner Cabin". (TR. 15) 
The transaction was so hurried and entered into under 
such pressure, Mr. Brady being in a state of opposition, 
confusion and exhaustion, that no attempt was even made 
to specifically describe what was to be included. (TR. 
71) 
Mr. Brady took a copy of the document with him and 
left. He had confided in Mr. Fausett as a father would 
in a son, and had counted on the sale of cattle to clear 
up his financial obligations. Now, because Respondents 
had been taken into Mr. Brady's confidence, he was put 
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into a position of either entering into a transaction 
which he knew he wasn't ready to handle and did not want 
anything to do with or lose the sale of cattle he had 
counted on to extract himself from his financial diffi-
culties. Mr. Brady went to Colorado (TR. 74) where Mr. 
Fausett continued to pressure him to go through with the 
deal. When Mr. Brady told Mr. Fausett he was sick and 
wanted to be left alone, Mr. Fausett expressed concern 
that Mr. Brady would die before the papers were signed 
and offered to take him to a doctor in Salt Lake City 
(TR. 79 & 82) after the papers were signed. 
Mr. Brady discussed the matter with the Colorado P. 
C.A. officials (TR. 75) and one of his sons and told the 
son that he had no intentions of signing the contract (TR. 
176) -; 
' " The P.C.A. officials told him the document was poorly 
prepared and that he didn't have to sign it if he didn't 
want to (TR. 76). He promised one of his daughters he 
wouldn't sign any papers until he had talked to her. (TR. 
209, 210) 
-16-
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Mr. Brady, as soon as he was able, returned to Utah 
to tell Mr. Fausett. (TR. 80) Mr. Brady and Mr. Fausett 
met and argued late into the night. (TR. 80 & 81) Mr. 
Fausett took the approach of threatening to pull out of 
the deal entirely and in fact turning back to Mr. Brady 
the ranch which he had previously purchased from Mr. Bra-
dy. (TR. 261 & 262) Because of his close relationship 
with Mr. Brady and the confidence from which he benefited, 
Mr. Fausett knew well that Mr. Brady, at that time, was 
in no condition to handle his cattle by himself and des-
perately needed to get the money from their sale and the 
earlier ranch sale to Mr. Fausett. (TR. 262) 
The next morning, Mr. Brady being very ill and ex-
hausted, was driven by Mr. Fausett to Vernal where Mr. 
Brady placed his signature on the document without dis-
cussing it with any member of his family despite his prior 
practice and promise of doing so. (TR. 187, 188, 197, 
209, 210) Mr. Brady again expressed his refusal to in-
clude the.Milner and Williams1 Places. Mr. Colton told 
him that he would have to come back and finish up the con-
tract by inserting the property descriptions of the lands 
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to be included since he was the only one who knew what 
lands were to go into the agreement, but that the incom-
plete agreement would do for now. Mr. Brady is still con-
fused and does not know for sure what happened that he put 
his signature on an agreement without any property descrip-
tion. (TR. 71, 128) He said at the trial: 
l!I don't hesitate in making a statement 
that I was so rum-dum after the condition which 
I had gone through that I didn't . . . I've 
never figured out yet hardly what happened from 
then on. I never figured out how come that I 
would sign an agreement of that kind.11 
(TR. 71) 
Mr. Fausett then drove Mr. Brady, still very ill, to the 
Vernal Airport from where he flew to Las Vegas, Nevada. 
Mr. Brady was confined in bed at the home of his daughter 
for approximately forty days. (TR. 84, 85, 210) His son-
-in-law described his condition at the time as being com-
pletely shell-shocked and mentally incapable of making 
any decisions. (TR. 220) During this time, Mr. Fausett 
took possession of the Brady properties and cattle as he 
was to care for and manage the cattle until time to count 
and ship them. 
In October of 1972, while Mr. Brady was still sick 
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Respondent Fausett secured from Hugh Colton a copy of the 
document entitled "Agreement to Sell Cattle and Lease Lands 
With Option to Purchase11 and took it without Mr. Brady!s 
consent or knowledge (TR. 295, 318, 319) to the Meeker, 
Colorado Office of the Bureau of Land Management and request-
ed that all of Mr. Brady's B.L.M. grazing privileges be 
transferred to Mr. Fausett and Mr. Smith. (TR. 16, 17, 
106 & 165) When the B.L.M. observed that the document 
was incomplete and that it did not contain any property 
description, they required Mr. Fausett to furnish a doc-
ument with the property description before any grazing 
privilege could be transferred. A description of some 
lands was secured, taped to a copy of the document en-
titled "Agreement to Sell Cattle and Lease Lands With 
Option to Purchase11, and filed with the B.L.M. (Exhibit 
12) The description of the properties inserted in the 
document described some lands which were not even owned 
by Mr. Brady, yet failed to describe other lands which 
were. On the basis of this document, the Bureau of Land 
Management transferred to Fausett and Smith all of Lowell 
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Brady's grazing privileges with the B.L..M., consisting of 
some 60,000 acres of land. This action effectively de-
prived Mr. Brady of any opportunity to require Fausett 
and Smith to sit down and finalize the agreement. 
When Mr. Brady determined what had occurred, he for-
mally protested the transfer of Grazing Privileges by the 
B.L.M., which protest is now pending in the Department of 
the Interior. 
All during the Winter of 1972 and Spring of 1973, Mr. 
Brady attempted to get an accounting from Mr. Fausett as 
to the number of cattle Mr. Fausett claimed to have re-
ceived (TRv< 86 & 87) and to follow up on what Mr. Brady 
considered the unfinished bttsiriess of completing the trans-
action by reaching an agreement on which lands were to be 
included. (TR. 106, 107, 108, 109 & 115, and Exhibits L6 
and 17) 
As Mr. Brady recuperated from his illness in the Spring 
of 1973 and his attempts to talk with Mr. Fausett to. clear 
up what he considered to be the unfinished business of fi-
nalizing the incompleted transaction brought no results, in 
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the early Summer of 1973, Mr. Smith and Mr. Fausett were 
given written notice that Mr. Brady did not consider him-
self bound by the agreement, and eventually a notice to 
quit was served on Fausett and Smith and the instant ac-
tion was filed to have the incomplete document declared 
invalid. (TR. 115 and Exhibits 16 & 17) 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
IN EQUITY CASES THE APPEAL MAY BE ON QUESTIONS OF BOTH 
LAW AND FACT. 
Article VIII, Section 9, of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah, relates to appeals from District Courts 
and provides in pertinent part as follows: 
"In equity cases the appeal may be on 
questions of both law and fact; . . ." 
The case before the Court being a case in equity (TR. 
1 & 2) involving questions of right to specific performance 
under an asserted contract, the Supreme Court has the re-
sponsibility to review the evidence. Nokes v. Continen-
tal Min. & Mill Co., 6 Utah 2d. 177, 308 P.2d 954 (1957). 
In fact it is the duty of the Supreme Court under Section 
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9 of Article VIII of the Constitution of Utah to review 
the facts, make an independent analysis of them, and de-
termine what findings and conclusions can be properly 
drawn from the evidence. Crockett v. Nish, 106 Utah 241, 
147 P.2d 853 (1944). 
II. 
THE DOCUMENT ENTITLED "AGREEMENT TO SELL CATTLE AND LEASE 
LAND WITH OPTION TO PURCHASE" WHICH DOES NOT DESCRIBE THE 
LANDS TO BE INVOLED BUT STATES THAT A DESCRIPTION WILL BE 
INSERTED LATER IS UNENFORCEABLE. 
The Agreement before the Court is unenforceable be-
cause it does not meet the requirements of the Statute of 
Frauds. Furthermore, to supply a property description 
which the parties themselves did not agree upon would vi-
olate the parol evidence rule. Davison v. Robbins, 30 
Utah 2d., 388, 517 P.2d 1026 (1973). There appears to be 
no conflict in the rule that blank deeds or blank papers 
executed as was the "Agreement to Sell Cattle and Lease 
Land With Option to Purchase" are void and do not convey 
any interest in or title to land. Utah State Building & 
Loan Ass'n. v.-Perkins, Et;Al., 53 Utah 474, 173 P. 950 
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(1918). A long line of cases establishes that in order 
to comply with the Statute of Frauds, a contract or deed 
for the conveyance of land must contain a description of 
the land sufficiently definite to locate it without re-
course to oral testimony. Barth v. Barth, 143 P.2d 542 
(Wash. 1943); Martinsen v. Cruikshank, 3 Wash. 2d. 565, 
101 P.2d 604 (1940). Papers executed in blank as to the 
description of the property intended to be conveyed are 
a nullity. Utah State Building and Loan Ass!n. v. Per-
kins, Et. Al., 53 Utah 474, 173 P. 950 (1918); Mesich 
v. Board of County Commissioners of McKinley County, 129 
P.2d 974 (N.M. 1942); Dahlberg v. Johnson1s Estate, 211 
P.2d 764 (Ida. 1949). 
This Court recently stated in the case of Davison v. 
Robbins the rule which is applicable in the instant case. 
"Parol evidence will not be admitted to 
complete a defective description, or to show 
the intention with which it was made. Parol 
evidence way be used for the purpose of ident-
ifying the description contained in the writ-
ing with it's location upon the ground, but 
not for the purpose of ascertaining and lo-
cating the land about which the parties nego-
tiated, and supplying a description thereof 
which they have omitted from the writing.; " 
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There is a clear distinction between the 
admission of oral and extrinsic evidence 
for the purpose of identifying the land 
described and applying the description to 
the property and that of supplying and 
adding to a description insufficient and 
void on its fact.11 
Davison v. Robbins, 30 Utah 2d. 338, 517 
P.2d 1026, (1973) at 342. 
The context in which the instant case came before 
the Court is a request for a declaration as to whether 
or not specific performance of the contract would be or-
dered. It is elementary that the law will not enforce 
specific performance of a contract unless the contract 
is definite, certain and complete. Equity cannot make a 
contract for the parties when they themselves have not a-
greed upon its terms. Allen v. Kitchen, 16 Ida. 133, 100 
P. 1052 (1909); Brooks v. Allard, 244 C.A. 2d 283, 53 
Cal.Rptr. 82 (1966); Corona Unified School District of 
Riverside County v. Velar, 165 C.A. 2d. 561, 332 P.2d 
294 (1959); Herrmann v. Hodin, 58 Wash. 2d. 441 364 P.2d 
21 (1961); Meadowlark Investment Corp. v. Croeni, 237 
Ore. 535, 392 P.2d 327 (1964). In the instant case, any 
evidence introduced by Defendants would not be that of 
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identification of a description good on its face; rather 
it would be for the purpose of supplying a description o-
mitted originally from an incomplete and indefinite con-
tract and is therefore inadmissable for the purpose of sup-
plying that to the contract. 
Mr. Brady has contended that the parties never agreed 
on what lands were to be placed in the incomplete document 
entitled "Agreement to Sell Cattle and Lease Land With Op-
tion to Purchase11. That this is so is evidenced by the 
fact that Defendants themselves have claimed in four sep-
arate instances that the document should have included at 
least four different property descriptions. First, Respon-
dents took the position at trial that all of the lands 
owned by Lowell Brady in the State of Colorado were a part 
of the transaction. Notwithstanding that assertion, the 
Respondents supplied the Bureau of Land Management a copy 
of the document entitled !fAgreement to Sell Cattle and 
Lease Land With Option to Purchase11 (TR. 165) containing 
a description of properties which not only included lands 
not owned by Mr. Brady, but also did not include lands 
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which actually were owned by him. Even at the time of 
trial, Respondent Fausett remained under the misconcep-
tion that all.lands owned by Lowell Brady were tied up 
with the B.L.M. as base land. This was not true, how-
ever, as the entire 440-acre N-Bar Ranch was not used as 
B.L.M. base land. The reason for this misconception on 
the part of Respondent stems from the fact that he and Mr. 
Brady never discussed selling all of the properties owned 
by Mr. Brady, and when Mr. Fausett found descriptions for 
approximately 2,120 acres, he figured he had all Mr. Bra-
dy owned. 
Third, Fausett and Smith were obligated under the a-
greement to pay all of the real estate taxes on the lands 
involved in the contract. (Exhibit 4, Paragraph 8) The 
Respondents for two years after 1972 did not pay taxes on 
the Williams and Milner Places, the lands which Mr. Brady 
had insisted on keeping. Mr. Brady paid those taxes both 
years and has done so since that time, which was in accord-
ance with his understanding that those lands were retained 
by him. Interestingly, Fausett claimed at trial that he 
paid taxes on all the property he bought from Mr. Brady, 
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(TR. 28) yet the exhibits show without dispute that Mr. 
Bradyt not Fausett, paid those Garfield County taxes for 
1972, 1973 & 1974, following the contract; also that Mr. 
Brady paid all taxes on all lands for 1973 & 1974. (TR. 
103, 104, 159, 160, 290 and Exhibit 14) 
Respondents1 failure to pay taxes on those particu-
lar lands support Mr. Brady1s position that those lands 
w^re never to have been included in the agreement. 
;. Fourth, Respondents have asserted that they purchased 
2,120 acres from Appellant. (TR. 27) Even under oath 
while answering interrogatories with the help of their 
attorneys, Respondents claimed to have purchased 2,120 
acres. At trial, Respondents1 counsel persisted in using 
the 2,120 acre figure. (TR. 139) The Appellant actually 
owned 12,560 acres in Colorado. If Defendants1 statement 
is true, they therefore did not purchase 440 acres which 
Appellant would, of course, therefore retain. This is 
consistent with what Appellant has claimed from the be-
ginning. He would voluntarily consider 2,120 acres as 
being the agreement, thus leaving him the approximately 
400 acres which he desired to retain. Respondents, how-
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ever, took the self-contradicting position that they were 
to have all of Mr. Brady's lands, but only 2,120 acres of 
them. There could be no clearer evidence to support the 
Plaintiff1 s position that no agreement was actually reach-
ed. The different positions taken by the Respondents are 
so inconsistent that it is clear that they themselves have 
not come to any agreement as to what was to be involved. 
The trial court in its Memorandum Decision dated March 
24, 1975, based its conclusion that a valid contract had 
been reached on two points, neither of which can be sup-
ported by the evidence. First, the Court found that Plain-
tiff's lawyer, presumably Mr. Hugh Colton, who appeared as 
a witness in the case against Mr. Brady (TR. 328) and was 
never paid anything for the contract by Mr. Brady, (TR. 
117) was given full authority from Plaintiff to ascertain 
the correct legal descriptions of the properties to go in-
to the agreement. Nothing in the evidence supports that 
conclusion. To the contrary, all the evidence, including 
the testimony of Mr. Fausett and Mr. Colton (TR. 243) was 
that Mr. Brady was to furnish the descriptions. (TR. 16) 
He alone knew what he was going to include. Mr. Colton 
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sent for some abstracts to only part of the property (TR. 
128). He told Lowell Brady he was the only one who knew 
what was to go into the deal and encouraged him to come 
finish it up. (TR. 73, 119) Even if he were acting pur-
suant to an authorization by Mr. Brady to include some 
property descriptions, the fact remains undisputed that 
he never did do that and has not done so even now, three 
years later. Obviously, he did not consider himself au-
thorized as the court found him to be. The finding is 
not supported by the record, and if it were, it would not 
cure the Statute of Frauds defects since no description 
was ever inserted. 
The second point on which the Court relied in reaching 
its conclusion that specific performance was appropriate 
was that Respondents had partially performed, and that 
Appellant had accepted benefits therefrom, which estopped 
Appellant from asserting that the agreement was unenforce-
able. 
Presumably the acts relied upon to cure the lack of 
legal description in this case involved the taking of po-
ssession by Respondents. Mere possession alone is insuff-
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icient. Van Trotha v. Bamberger, 15 Col. 1, 24 P. 883 
(1890). Moreover, the evidence clearly shows that Mr. 
Brady did not really deliver possession in any true sense, 
but that Respondents took possession from him during his 
time of sickness. When Respondents took possession, it 
was consistent with their purchase of the cattle. It 
might also be construed as consistent with a lease of 
some lands, but is not persuasive in an argument regard-
ing which lands were to be under any lease or option. 
It is factually significant that the Respondent es-
tablished a new camp. Nothing in the evidence indicates 
their use of the cabin on the Milner Place which Mr. Bra-
dy had insisted on keeping. Neither did the Respondents 
make any of their improvements on the Milner Place, the 
Williams Place, or the Gomez Place, an indication of their 
undertainty about which lands were to be retained by the 
Appellant. In addition, it should be noted that the part 
performance which Respondents claim by their establishing 
of a trailer camp and new corrals is in reality nothing 
more than work which needed to be done in any event for 
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the purpose of facilitating the rounding up of the cattle 
which they had previously agreed to purchase from Mr. Bra-
dy. 
The terms of the document of July 25th and the adden-
dum clearly indicate that the monies paid Mr. Brady in Ju-
ly and October of 1972 were for the payment of cattle and 
had nothing whatsoever to do with any payment on lands. 
(TR. 121, 124 & 125) Likewise, the money which was sent 
to Mr. Brady at the beginning of each year, and which each 
time Respondents refused to take back when Mr. Brady attemp-
ted to return the money to them (TR. 159) , can only be con-
strued as fair compensation to Mr. Brady for the use Re-
spondents have had of his property. Each such check or 
draft has itself had noted thereon by Respondents them-
selves the words "rental" or "lease payment". (TR. 125, 
126 & 127) Appellant indicated that he is holding any
 f 
pre-payment of rent and stands ready to return it to Re-
spondents upon their delivery to him of possession of his 
property. Respondents were aware that Mr. Brady did not 
• • * • • . ' • • • • 
consider the sale of land closed as evidenced by their 
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efforts to get him to take some money on the land as ear-
ly as October of 1972. (TR. 226) 
Specific performance will Daly be decreed when the 
party asking it will be defrauded if it is not granted. 
Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Company, 6 Utah 2d. 18 305 
P.2d 480 (1956). Respondents have not alleged nor have 
they proven any such kind of case. The evidence is un-
contradicted that as soon as Mr. Brady was partially re-
stored to health, he put Respondents on notice of his con-
cerns regarding the transaction. He contacted his attor-
ney, Mr. Chamberlain, in Richfield, Utah, in early 1973, 
who in turn wrote Mr. Fausett. Mr. Brady went to the Mee-
ker, Colorado, B.L.M. office and made his position known 
to B.L.M. personnel and Mr. Fausett. He and his son took 
horses and attempted to inspect the Milner ranch he had 
insisted he would never part with, but they were ordered 
off the property. (TR. 107) In early 1973, after pre-
vious informal conversations with Mr. Fausett in which he 
expressed his position, a formal notice to quit was served. 
Mr. Brady took every reasonable step under the circumstances 
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to put Defendants on notice of his position as soon as he 
got out of his sick bed. No fraud on his part has been 
alleged nor proven. 
Part performance as a doctrine may be used as a cure 
to a defective description only under circumstances not 
existing in this case. Partial performance is not a cure 
to the parol evidence rule problem with which the Supreme 
Court of Utah was concerned in the case of Davison v. Rob-
bins, 30 Utah 2d. 338, 517 P.2d 1026 (1973). The case be-
fore the Court has both Statute of Frauds and parol evi-
dence problems. It is clear that the July 25th "Agree-
ment to Sell Cattle and Lease Land With Option to Purchase11 
does not contain a sufficient description of property to 
meet the requirements of the Statute of Frauds. The Re-
spondents, therefore, persuaded the trial court to employ 
the doctrine of partial performance to cure the lack of 
description. The law without variation is that partial 
performance will not be employed to require specific per-
formance unless the contract is clear, definite, and cer-
tain. Certainty and definiteness are not found in the in-
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stant case. The parol evidence rule then comes into play. 
Parol evidence is admissible to apply, but not to supply, 
a description of lands in a contract. Davison v. Robbins, 
30 Utah 2d. 338, 517 P.2d 1026 (1973). Partial perform-
ance, if it were shown, does not overcome the parol evi-
dence problem found in this case. Even more than in the 
Davison case, there is a lack of certainty here. The par-
ties left to a later time the determination and insertion 
of a description of the exact lands to be involved. The . 
evidence of the case is uncontradicted that the withhold-
ing of some lands was discussed and no final agreement was 
made. Exhibit No. 5, Hugh Colton's letter to Fausett, in 
its final paragraph clearly sets forth his understanding 
that after the cattle sale was concluded, the parties 
would have to meet and work out the description of the 
lands to be involved. ; 
The Statute of Frauds was enacted for the very pur-
pose to which it should be applied here, that is to pre-
vent parties from claiming that lands have been sold to 
them when there is no written agreement to evidence the 
same. 
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Also, specific performance is a doctrine of equity. 
Those who request it must come to court with clean hands. 
Specific performance will not be decreed unless damages 
would be inadequate. Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Com-
pany, 6 Utah 2d. 18, 305 P.2d 480 (1956). Without conce-
ding any damages to Respondents, it is respectfully sub-, 
mitted that damages for any monies Respondents might prove 
to have spent or which might benefit Mr. Brady upon his 
regaining possession of his lands will be adequate. The 
counterclaim of Respondents evidences Respondents concur-
rence in the idea that they can be compensated with money 
damages. 
The Court should rule that the document before the 
Court is unenforceable for the reason that it is incom-
plete, lacks a description of properties, and that there 
was never an agreement between the parties as to which 
lands were to be involved. Certainly the Court cannot 
determine the intention of the parties from the four cor-
ners of the instrument as required by the law. Further-
more, the evidence is persuasive that no enforceable a-
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greement was reached. 
III. 
THE OPTION TO PURCHASE LANDS IN THE WRITING OF JULY 25, 
1972 IS UNENFORCEABLE BECAUSE NO CONSIDERATION WAS GIVEN 
FOR IT. 
Prior to the meeting at Hugh Coltonfs office, Brady 
and Fausett had agreed on a sale of cattle for which Mr. 
Brady was to be paid, plus a ten (10) year lease with pay-
ments to Mr. Brady of $25,000.00 per year. (TR. 58 & 59) 
After the meeting, there was an agreement calling for the 
sale of cattle and a 5-year rather than a 10-year lease, 
with payments still at $25,000.00 per year and an option 
to purchase. (Exhibit 4) No consideration was given for 
the option. In fact, Mr. Brady had less than before. The 
inescapable conclusion must be that there exists no valid 
option for want of consideration. 
An option is defined in a simple and elementary way . 
as a binding promise to keep an offer open for a stated 
period of time or until a specified date. O.A. 01in v. , 
>: Lambach, 35 Ida. 767, 209 P.277, 44 A.L.R. 354; Daven-
port v. Doyle Petroleum Corporation, 190 Okla. 548, 126 
P.2d 54; Strong v. Moore, 105 Ore. 12, 207 P. 179, 23 
A.L.R. 1217. 
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It has long been established that the consideration 
for an option to purchase land is a thing apart from the 
consideration for the lease or of the actual sale of the 
land. There must be some consideration of which it can 
be said "This was given by the proposed purchaser to the 
proposed vendor as the price for the option for the priv-
ilege to purchase." Ide v. Leiser, 10 Mont. 5, 24 P. 695 
(1890). The evidence clearly indicates that the rental 
of $25,000.00 per year was arrived at through negotiations 
between Mr. Brady and Mr. Fausett and was agreed upon be-
fore any discussion with regard to an option was held. 
Also, the price of the cattle was specifically set forth. 
Not one cent has been paid to Appellant for an option to 
purchase lands. No consideration having been given for 
the option, it should be held invalid and unenforceable. 
.iv. :"';- * :" 
THE COURT SHOULD SET ASIDE THE CONTRACT OF JULY 25, 1972 
BECAUSE PLAINTIFF WAS INCAPABLE OF CONDUCTING BUSINESS 
OF THE MAGNITUDE INVOLVED AT THE TIME HE SIGNED IT AND 
DEFENDANTS ABUSED A RELATIONSHIP OF TRUST WHICH HAD BEEN 
ESTABLISHED AND EXTRACTED A CONTRACT APPELLANT WOULD NOT 
OTHERWISE HAVE* GIVEN. 
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The fact that Mr. Brady was in very poor physical 
health, was mentally exhausted^ confused and unstable is 
virtually uncontested and in fact is confirmed by the tes-
timony of Respondent, John Fausett. (TR. 26, 42, 43, 48, 
53, 79, 80, 205, 208, 209 & 214) Also uncontested is the 
fact that a very close relationship was established be-
tween Mr. Brady and Mr. Fausett to the extent that Mr. 
Brady placed his trust and confidence in Mr. Fausett in 
his person&l and business problems. (TR. 7, 9, 10, 36, 
47, 48, 264, 267 & 268) Indeed, Mr. Fausett went so far 
as to say at trial that he had grown to love Mr. Brady. 
(TR. 264) Whenever two persons stand in such relation 
that confidence is necessarily reposed by one and the in-
fluence which naturally grows out of that confidence is 
possessed by the other, and this confidence is abused or 
the influence is exerted to obtain an advantage at the ex-
pense of the confiding party, the person so availing him-
self of this position will not be permitted to retain the 
advantage, even if the transaction could not have been 
impeached if nd confidential relationship had existed. 
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The courts of equity have carefully refrained from 
defining the particular instances of fiduciary relation-
ships in such a manner that other and perhaps new cases 
might be excluded. It is settled by an overwhelming 
weight of authority that the principle extends to every 
possible case in which a fiduciary relationship exists 
as a fact, in which there is confidence reposed on one 
side and resulting superiority and influence on the other. 
The relationship and the duties involved in it need not 
be legal; they may be moral, social, domestic, or merely 
personal. Bentley v. Bentley, 141 Md. 428, 119 A. 293. 
When such a fiduciary relationship is established as in 
this case, the burden of proof should be shifted to de-
fendants to prove that the transaction was fair, just 
and reasonable. Hinshaw v. Hinshaw, 148 Colo. 262, 365 
P.2d 815 (1961). This contract should be set aside on 
the basis of the inequality between the parties, where 
there existed weakness on one side and advantage taken 
of that weakness on the other. Respondents, upon finding 
Mr. Brady's weakness, utilized it to extract from him a 
contract which he would not otherwise have made. In these 
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circumstances, the law presumes in favor of Mr. Brady and 
against the Respondents that: 
(1) The relationship placed the Respondents in 
a position to exercise influence and do-
minion over Mr. Brady; 
(2) That influence or dominion operated upon and 
procured the transaction, and 
(3) That the influence was improper and unfair 
or, to use the accepted phrase, was an un-
due influence. 
This transaction should not stand unless the Respondents 
are able to repel the presumption by contrary evidence 
proving that it was fair, just, and reasonable. Pitt-
brenner v. Myerson, 414 Colo. 448, 167 P.2d 15 (1946). 
Whenever a person is in pecuniary necessity and dis-
tress so that he would be likely to make an undue sacri-
fice, and advantage is taken of such condition to obtain 
from him a conveyance or contract which is unfair, made 
upon inadequate consideration, or upon other, highly in-
adequate terms,, even though there may be no actual duress 
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or threats, equity may relieve defensively or affirma-
tively. Dittbrenner v. Myerson, 414 Colo. 448, 167 P.2d 
15 (1946). The principle upon which a court of equity 
acts in relieving transactions on the ground of inequal-
ity of footing between the parties is not confined to 
cases where fiduciary relationship is shown to exist, but 
extends to all varieties of relationship in which dominion 
may be exercised by one over another, and this principle 
applies to er^€ty c^^evihere influence is acquired and a-
bused or where confidence is reposed and betrayed. Ditt-
brenner, Supra. 
As Justice Frankfurter stated in U.S. v. Bethlehem 
Steel Corp. 86 L.Ed. 855, 877: 
nDoes any principle in our law have more 
universal application than the doctrine that 
Courts will not enforce transactions in which 
the relative positions of the parties are such 
that one has unconscionably taken advantage of 
the necessities of the other? Fraud and phy-
sical duress are not the only grounds upon 
which Courts refuse to enforce contracts. The 
law is not so primitive that it sanctions every 
injustice except brute force and downright fraud. 
More specifically, the Courts generally refuse 
to lend themselves to the enforcement of a bar-
gain in which one party has unjustly taken ad-
vantage of the economic necessities of the other. 
And there is great reason and justice in this 
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rule, for necessitous men are not, truly speak-
ing, free men, but, to answer a present exigency 
will submit to any terms that the crafty may 
impose upon them*11 
No better opportunity has presented itself to a Court 
to apply the principles above set forth than in the instant 
case, where Defendants found Mr. Brady in a sick, exhaust-
ed and financially oppressed condition, and then took him 
in, helped him, obtained his confidence, and led him to 
believe they would buy his cattle and lease his land, and 
finally, when no alternative was left to Mr. Brady, ex-
tracted from him a contract he would not otherwise have 
signed. 
CONCLUSION 
Because of the lack of agreement about the lands 
which were to be involved, the lack of consideration for 
the option, and the inequitable manner in which Respondents 
abused Mr. Brady's trust and confidence in the dire cir-
cumstances in which they found him, the Court should re-
verse the lower court and set aside the July 25th docu-
ment entitled "Agreement to Sell Cattle and Lease Land 
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With Option to Purchase", putting the parties back to the 
position they were in prior to the execution of it. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
GAYLE F. MCKEACHNIE 
TYRRELL R. SEAGER 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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